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Conference Report

Report on the Fourth Meeting of the CSCAP
North Pacific Working Group

8-10 November 1998
Jing Lun Hotel, Beijing, China

Co-Chairs
Brian L. Job (CSCAP Canada)
Yoshinobu Yamamoto (CSCAP Japan)

Fourth NPWG meeting in Beijing, 8-10 November 1998

The fourth meeting of the North Pacific Working Group was held in Beijing, November 8-10. This was the first time that the NPWG has met outside the home countries of the co-chairs, previous meetings having been held in Tokyo (1995), Vancouver (January, 1997), and Makuhari (December, 1997). CSCAP China served as the host for this fourth meeting.

The NPWG continues to be a "full house" dialogue engaging all parties in the North Pacific. The meetings were attended by representatives from the following CSCAP Member Committees: Australia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Europe, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, United States, and Vietnam. Also participating were two "other participants" and one expert invited by the co-chairs. The Member Committees of Russia and the Philippines sent observers to the meeting. Officials from various local embassies and institutions in Beijing attended sessions as well. In all, approximately 40 individuals were present during the Working Group sessions. (A list of participants is provided in Annex A. Copies of papers delivered, as listed in Annex B, may be obtained from the Co-Chairs.)

Advance consultation with Member Committees by the Co-Chairs resulted in agreement to focus four topics at the Beijing meeting:

• the security implications of the regional economic crisis, particularly for North Pacific states,
• the significance of recent increased bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relations among the major powers of Northeast Asia,
• the evolving circumstances on the Korean Peninsula, in South and North Korea and concerning other parties, and
• concern over the proliferation of weapons and the effectiveness of nonproliferation regimes regarding Northeast Asia.

In light of the significant developments that had occurred since the last WG meeting, there was a general sense among participants that this meeting was taking place at a critical moment for security cooperation at regional and global levels. In their opening remarks, the Co-Chairs drew attention to the positive and potentially negative implications of certain events and trends in Northeast Asia. They pointed to the challenge to the NPWG to formulate an agenda that advanced multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia along two avenues: first, in the general area of confidence-building and dialogue; and second, in more focused efforts to identify and jointly study issues of concern to the actors of the North Pacific.

Security Implications of the Asian Economic Crisis

This was the first opportunity for the WG systematically to consider the economic crisis and its potential impact upon security matters. The papers presented and subsequent discussions were far-ranging, considering the impact of the crisis on domestic conditions, (including civil-military relations and military acquisitions), on the systemic security environment, and on regional economic/security cooperation activities in Northeast Asia and in the Asia Pacific region.

There was unanimous agreement that the crisis had brought great economic turbulence to the region and had reversed the results of decades of economic growth and prosperity for vast numbers of people. There was little debate about the causes of the crisis, which were seen to be a combination of internal factors (lack of regulation and transparency, irregular business practices, etc.) and external forces (global capital markets, initially misguided responses from IFIs, etc.). There was, however, less consensus among participants concerning the security implications of the crisis. In part this depended upon whether one took a short vs. long term perspective or focused upon Northeast Asia as opposed to Southeast Asia.

Several participants suggested that the graver security implications of the crisis were exaggerated. While domestic instability was a serious concern in Southeast Asia, it was not in Northeast Asia. Because the overall economic and security fundamentals were sound, in several years the region would be on the rebound. The most optimistic suggested that the "economic crisis has promoted subregional cooperation É among the regional economies in Northeast Asia." "Asia may turn a misfortune into a blessing." Others noted the dampening of arms acquisitions and defence budgets in Southeast Asia (but not in Northeast Asia, except for South Korea.) There was some discussion about the observation that countries that had recently undergone political reform, i.e., South Korea and Thailand appeared to be better equipped to weather the crisis.

Others cautioned that the WG was paying "not enough attention to what might happen", as the crisis was not over yet and would not be for several years at best. Furthermore, the crisis needed to be appreciated, not simply as a series of economic downturns, but as a phenomenon that undermined the psychological, social, political, and security fundamentals of the post-Cold War Asia Pacific community. From this perspective, the following issues were highlighted:

• The capacities of several key countries, particularly Indonesia and Russia, to reform their economies and to sustain social and political order were cause for serious concern.
• All governments in the region will, of necessity, be more preoccupied with internal affairs and have less attention and resources (both human and fiscal) to devote to regional matters.
• The crisis has brought home the realization that the economic and larger human dimensions of "security" can not be ignored in the formulation of national security and domestic policies. Without the establishment of minimal social safety nets, the populations of Asian states can not be regarded as "secure". One paper, in particular, drew attention to threats to human security posed by the economic crisis, including instrastate ethnic conflict, involuntary migration, environmental degradation, and transnational criminal activities.
• For Northeast Asia, the impact of the crisis may be felt on the Korean Peninsula as causing "broadened support for a slower process" of South-North economic interaction.
• The issue of leadership was debated concerning especially the US and China. The former was criticized for not having done enough soon enough and is now feeling the effects of some "backlash". The latter was regarded as having positioned itself very advantageously and as continuing to play an important role in ensuring regional economic stability. Some participants referred to a long term "fundamental shift in the regional balance of power" with regard to China's role. Others were more cautious, noting the major challenges that face Chinese leaders in their domestic economy and noting that the US, with its healthy economy, is in fact in a more dominant regional position than before.

• A general concern was expressed regarding the capacity of regional economic and security institutions--ASEAN, the ARF, and APEC. With ASEAN countries preoccupied with internal and economic problems and with increasing signs of dysfunctional tensions among them on various matters, they would appear to have little capacity to sustain the momentum they have provided to security regionalism. The "weakening of ASEAN undermines the ARF" was the view of many. Some participants were optimistic that ASEAN could and would regroup in several years. As far as Northeast Asia was concerned, there was a feeling that "the momentum may have shifted from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia," thus providing the opportunity, indeed the necessity, for players in the subregion to energize on Track 1 and Track 2 levels.

Korean Peninsula

The unfolding situation on the Korean Peninsula remains at the core of the Northeast Asian security complex and thus is a central focus of each NPWG meeting. A series of recent, important political and economic developments in both the North and the South were noted by participants in this fourth meeting. These included the consolidation of Kim Jong Il's leadership in the DPRK and the election of Kim Dae Jung in South Korea. The economic difficulties being experienced in both countries were reviewed. Progress (or the lack thereof) on Four-Party Talks and on KEDO's operations were discussed. In general terms, while most agreed that there have been certain positive movements, an overall, "apparent intractability" prevails regarding the Peninsula. This continues both because of the impasse between North and South and, in the words of one participant, because the "major powers thus far have failed É to build a habit of formal sub-regional security cooperation or to implement other practical cooperative measures that might more strongly facilitate inter-Korean reconciliation efforts."

It was agreed that progress towards settlement on the Korean Peninsula must necessarily involve resolution of bilateral issues between North and South and at the same time establishment of an international regime, or regimes, that satisfies the interests of the major powers and engages their commitment over the long term. Thus, inter-Korean and international issues are inextricably intertwined, but how to manage and effectively implement a workable "division of labor" (a term that some objected to) among interested parties remains an illusive goal. There was agreement, however, that there are notable contradictions and discontinuities in current policies that could and should be resolved. (Indeed, participants suggested that this would be a useful avenue for further work by the NPWG.)

There was substantial discussion on several specific issues:

• Progress on KEDO: All participants regarded it as essential that the agenda of KEDO be sustained. It was hoped that US congressional pressures would not further hinder deliveries of HFO. Recent Japanese and South Korean reassurances concerning their financial contributions to KEDO were noted, suggesting that construction of the LW reactors, while delayed, would proceed. The DPRK places great emphasis on KEDO and the importance of maintaining the schedule of fuel deliveries and construction set out in negotiated agreements. On the other hand, whereas a number of participants suggested that KEDO could serve as "a model" for structuring other cooperative efforts, doubts were expressed as to whether the DPRK regarded KEDO in this fashion.
• US-DPRK relations: Both the process and substance of aspects of this key bilateral relationship were explored. Movement towards normalization of relations was highlighted as an important concern of the DPRK. Disagreements regarding the role of US troops on the Peninsula were aired, as were disagreements about whether or not a peace treaty between the US and DPRK should precede an inter-Korean treaty. It was also evident that different perceptions prevail regarding the purpose and functioning of the Agreed Framework.
• ROK-DPRK relations: The so-called "sunshine policy" undertaken by the new South Korean leadership was seen as a positive development by almost all participants. Discussion of the modalities of North-South unification revealed general agreement that the economic crises had slowed momentum and enthusiasm in the South, whereas the deep suspicion in the North of any possibility of absorption or replacement of its political system remains. In the course of a remarkably open and frank discussion, the WG was reminded that talk of "instructing" parties on the Peninsula and advocating activities that threatened the "way of life" advocated by each party were not welcome. The prospects for a "confederal" solution, as well as specific elements of a one country-two systems arrangement, were explored briefly.
• Multilateral Initiatives: The need for the creation of multilateral regimes as a framework for resolution on the Peninsula was accepted by all sides. However, the form and participants of such initiatives was not. Thus, while the Four Party talks were regarded as important, there was doubt about their ability to move forward, even through the recently announced subcommittee processes. The respective merits, as seen be various sides, of enlargement beyond four parties were debated, i.e., 4+2, 6, 6+1 schemes. Notice was given to the recent calls from Seoul, Tokyo, and Moscow for establishment of a 6 party, subregional security dialogue, but the general sense of participants was that it was premature to move quickly towards a Track 1 dialogue.

Proliferation

Northeast Asia remains among the most militarized regions of the world. Defence budgets are not declining appreciably. Acquisition of high tech, conventional weaponry proceeds apace, (unlike in Southeast Asia were the economic crisis has stalled such purchases). Developments over the past year to do with proliferation of weapons and Northeast Asia have not only heightened concerns about regional stability, but also raised major questions regarding the efficacy of the traditional strategies associated with nonproliferation regimes. In what was the first session that the NPWG has devoted to proliferation matters, attention was focused on the consequences of three sets of events: the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, the satellite launch/missile test by the DPRK, and the sale of missile and missile technology by regional states into other regions.

• Nuclear tests by Indian and Pakistan: The nuclearization of South Asia has had reverberations at subregional, regional, and global levels. Given the hostility and ongoing disputes that characterize India-Pakistan relations, many feared the prospects of setting off an escalation to a war (that would inevitably embroil China, the US, and maybe other states) or the sparking of a nuclear arms race. Regional stability, already upset given that India announced that Chinese nuclear weapons were the rationale for their acquisition, would be severely affected in such conditions. Finally, Indian and Pakistani actions strike a blow to existing proliferation regimes. Not only do they appear unenforceable, but the logic of sanctions and controls that they mandate appears to be misdirected. In addition, their actions and the ineffective responses of the international community signal to other potential developer states that possessing nuclear weapons does bring status and attention from the rest of the world.
• Satellite launch/missile test by the DPRK: Taken by surprise in August, regional states, especially Japan, had reacted sharply to the August event. These concerns were noted by WG participants, as was the continued assertion by the DPRK that this was a peaceful action, namely the launching of a satellite. Paradoxically, the result of the DPRK actions has been to accelerate Japanese-US collaboration on the introduction of theatre missile defence systems into the region, thus, as noted below, igniting a potentially serious dispute in US-China and China-Japan relations.
• Missile sales and transfer of technology: Sales of missiles by Northeast Asian states, particularly to Middle Eastern states and to Pakistan, have escalated in recent years, constituting both a threat to regional stability and to global supplier regimes designed to thwart the spread of such weaponry. Participants noted that development, deployment, and selling of weapons can be regarded as a sovereign right by a state. Also, governments may promote weapons transfers to attain much-needed revenue. It was pointed out in the WG session that the major powers themselves bear much responsibility for expanding the arsenals of Northeast Asian states and for having assisted, directly or indirectly, the development of nuclear capabilities in South Asia. Mention was made of US, Russian, Chinese, and European weapons transfers to Taiwan, to Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, and China (notably by Russia).

NWPG participants wrestled with how best to come to terms with weapons proliferation issues. The consensus view was that the most effective strategy is to promote the acceptance of global nonproliferation regimes that are universal and non-discriminatory. It was admitted, however, that current regimes such as the NPT do not meet such criteria in the view of certain states. Furthermore, the strategies of denial and sanctions mandated by these regimes and by individual states in their efforts to enforce the regimes were seen to have been ineffective. Addressing the root causes of proliferation, namely the structural forces of supply-push and demand-pull--the latter arising from continued perceptions of threats to national security--remains the most difficult challenge.

Certain initiatives at the regional level were noted: the 1992 intra-Korean agreements, the 1994 agreement between the US and the DPRK, and the 1994 communique of the US and PRC concerning the MTCR.

However, the issue on which most attention was focused was the introduction of theatre missile defence (TMD) systems into Northeast Asia. The prospect of initiatives by the US with Japan, and possibly Taiwan, on development and deployment of TMD systems is viewed with great concern, most directly by the PRC. WG participants briefly touched on the arguments being advanced pro and con regarding TMD by the parties involved. There remained a general concern that introduction of such systems may set off further destabilizing actions by states attempting to compensate for their perceived loss of security.

Bilateralism, Multilateralism in Northeast Asia

The status of relations among the major powers of Northeast Asia is a determining factor of regional stability and thus the subject of continued attention at NPWG meetings. This was particularly true of the meetings in Beijing. The consensus of participants was that recent steps taken by the major powers have created a network of bilateral relationships with significant, largely positive, results both for the states concerned and for regional security as a whole. In addition to the US-PRC, (which participants viewed as the determining dyadic relationship of the Asia Pacific region), US-Russia, US-Japan, China-Japan, China-Russia, and Japan-Russia bilateral ties were reviewed. The net effect, in the words of one participant, has been to create a "regime of summits". In the terminology of another, a process of "concerted bilateralism" has been established, effectively replicating certain aspects of a concert of powers. WG participants pursued these matters at some length, focusing particular attention on the following issues:

• The character of bilateral relationships. Although the sharp rhetorical tone of the debate within Northeast Asia over the appropriate form and function of bilateral relationships has diminished, WG discussions revealed that it still exists. In conceptual terms, the issue centres on the perceived attitude of bilateral partners towards third parties, one position being that so-called "strategic partnerships" which focus solely on advancing mutual interests better promote regional security than "defence alliances", which their critics regard as implicitly, if not directly, threatening to third parties. In practical terms, the argument remains centred on the role of the US-Japan alliance and concerns of the PRC regarding its purpose and scope.
• "Strategic triangles". A number of informal, triangular dialogues have been initiated among Northeast Asian powers, e.g., US-China-Japan and US-China-Russia. These were regarded as generally positive developments by most WG participants, in effect as another type of building block for regional security. However, certain caveats were raised: First was the concern that triangles are inherently unstable entities, with the actions of two parties always "reinforcing suspicions" of the third that it was being balanced against. Second was the view that trilateral arrangements were appropriately maintained at the Track 2 rather than the Track 1 level.
• Multilateral initiatives in Northeast Asia. In the past several years a number of multilateral groupings have been formed or proposed for Northeast Asia. Most all of these have arisen in the context of the Korean Peninsula--the Four-Party Talks, and the various formulations calling for up to six parties in various configurations. Most recently, there have been calls from Moscow, Tokyo, and Seoul for establishment of 6 or 6+1 (Mongolia) party, Track 1, dialogue mechanism for Northeast Asia. While WG participants were generally in favor of such developments, some doubts were raised about whether the subregion was "ready" for a Track 1 level process at this stage. Others indicated that no such initiative should proceed unless it were included all states. Several participants, from both larger and smaller states, expressed concern that such mechanisms had to guarantee that the interests of small/middle powers were not over ridden and that principles of non-interference and consensus had to be respected. There was also discussion, in passing, of the prospects for multilateral, functional cooperation to facilitate projects (KEDO), economic development (Tumen River), and natural resource management (fisheries and energy development/transportation). There was quite unanimous agreement among participants that such functional institutions would be increasingly necessary to manage the complex transnational economic and environmental problems of the subregion. (Previous Working Group meetings have had full sessions devoted to this topic.) Multilateralism vs. multipolarity. Participants were reminded of the need to think about the differences between processes oriented towards multilateralism and those oriented towards multipolarity. As carefully argued by one paper writer, the latter (including concert-type mechanisms) have a tendency towards regional, power balancing behavior by the major powers. On the other hand, implementation of multilateralism entails greater requirements--such as reciprocity, inclusivity, and strategic reassurance--and (for many participants) greater potential. It was acknowledged that progress towards multilateralism depends upon the major powers and that, in this regard, there had been noticeable favourable changes in attitude by China and the US.
• Northeast Asia and Asia Pacific security regionalism. Two related questions were consistently on WG participants' minds: (a) the status of progress of security cooperation in Northeast Asia/North Pacific, and (b) the role for Northeast Asian actors and subregional issues within the context of Asia Pacific security cooperation processes and institutions. On the first issue, i.e., the subregional level, there was general optimism that matters were moving forward in the ways noted above. On the second issue, however, there was substantial concern. In the words of one participant, reflecting the views of many worried about the "health" of ASEAN, the ARF, and the APEC forum, "multilateralist principles and structures, especially at the regional level, [are challenged] to retain relevance and credibility." For some, the present situation was regarded as as a temporary lull in ASEAN's ("essential") leadership in regional security. Others, more or less willing to accept this view, were concerned that Northeast Asian players needed to take a more proactive attitude, at both Track 1 and Track 2 levels. "Northeast Asia is at a historical crossroads." and "the momentum has shifted from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia" were sentiments accepted by many.

Next Steps for the North Pacific Working Group

There was a consensus that this Fourth Working Group meeting had been successful. There has been a notable trend towards fuller and franker discussion of issues at WG meetings. Certainly, all involved appreciate the importance of sustaining the NPWG's confidence-building role as the only "full house" security dialogue for the subregion.

Regarding the agenda for the Working Group as it looks forward to its next meeting (tentatively scheduled for Japan in late summer/early fall of 1999): Given the specific regional focus of the Working Group, its meeting agenda will always include sessions on (a) recent developments in Northeast Asia, (b) major power relations, and (c) the situation on the Korean Peninsula. There were a number of suggestions of additional topics to be considered at the next meeting, a specific agenda to be negotiated through the usual process of consultation by the Co-Chairs. These suggestions included: the security implications of the economic crisis as it continues to evolve; issues of human security, e.g., food security; the potential impact of the introduction of new weapons systems into the subregion, particularly TMD; review of the potential frameworks for reconciliation of North and South on the Korean Peninsula; and analysis of the integration of bilateral and multilateral processes among Northeast Asian/North Pacific actors.

The Co-Chairs were asked to investigate the feasibility of having preparatory work done on certain topics, facilitating consultation among Member Committees prior to the meetings, and allowing an agenda with more time for discussion during the meetings themselves.

Concerns were raised regarding Russia, both as a subject of discussion concerning regional security and as an active participant in the NPWG and other Track 2 processes. The Co-Chairs were encouraged to explore this matter with an eye to greater substantive consideration to Russia and to ensuring CSCAP Russia representative participation. The Co-Chairs indicated that the collection of papers from past Working Group meetings would soon be made available in a hard-copy compendium. Papers from this meeting would be placed upon an internet website in the near future, with all CSCAP participants to be informed of the location and details.

Acknowledgement:
All participants at the meetings in Beijing, and particularly the Co-Chairs of the NPWG, wish to acknowledge with thanks the generous hospitality and excellent logistical arrangements for the meetings provided by their host, CSCAP China, and the most competent staff of the Chinese Center International Studies.