JAPAN’S SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY-RELATED ISSUES

—Mapping Survey—
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Preface

This report is based on a mapping study conducted as part of a pilot project that the Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) launched in Spring 2018 to explore the potential for Japan to prioritize support for democratic governance in its foreign policy and overseas development assistance. The project was subsequently developed into a full-fledged, multiyear program designed to engage a wide range of experts and policymakers in the discussion of how Japan and its partners can strengthen democratic governance in Asia and around the world.

Initially, the report was envisioned as an internal survey of the field of democratic assistance that would provide background information for planning purposes. However, we later decided to publish it in the hope that it can serve as a useful reference for those wishing to gain a clearer sense of Japan's contributions to strengthening democratic governance around the world and the context in which Japanese policymakers operate.

In compiling this report, we relied on interviews with leading scholars and practitioners as well as a review of a number of studies published in Japanese and English. In particular, the writing of Maiko Ichihara, co-director of this project's study team, and Koichi Sugiura, a study team member during the pilot phase, proved to be invaluable resources. These provided in-depth data and a comprehensive perspective on Japan's historic involvement in the field of democracy assistance.

Other study team members, especially Ambassador Yukio Takasu, who heads the group, Takako Hikotani, and Kaori Shoji provided insightful advice and information during the research and writing, for which we are grateful. The report was also informed by the discussions at two JCIE events that were organized in June 2018 as part of the pilot project—a Tokyo seminar that convened nearly 30 scholars and other thought leaders and a roundtable with 8 Diet members that featured noted political scientist Francis Fukuyama and the president of the National Endowment for Democracy, Carl Gershman.

The report was authored by Atsuko Geiger with support from a team at JCIE's New York and Tokyo offices, and it was edited by Kim Gould Ashizawa with design and layout by Kiyoko Shiromasa. All errors are the responsibility of JCIE. We are very grateful for those who have participated in our program and their willingness to share their expertise and knowledge so generously.
1. Overview

Japan’s position on support for issues related to democracy has been mixed and often ambiguous. Nevertheless, the country’s policy in this field has evolved since the 1990s, and Japan has gradually increased its rhetorical commitment to democracy-related issues as well as the actual amount of aid it provides. Support for democracy was incorporated into Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, and more recently, both the 2013 National Security Strategy and the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter have listed support for democratization as a priority issue. Politicians have placed importance on democracy in Japan’s foreign policy, as most prominently represented in discussions of the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in the mid-2000s.\(^1\)

In practical terms, the share of ODA allocated to projects related to democracy has incrementally increased over the years. However, the amount of ODA spending in the field is still limited, especially in comparison to that of other OECD donors, and the types of projects carried out with ODA are also limited and tend to be heavily concentrated in assistance for legal infrastructure and technical support. Japan has also maintained a relatively low profile in terms of its efforts to support transitions to democracy—much lower than those of the Western liberal democracies of Europe and the United States in particular. Japan’s approach to democracy support has been described as hesitant, and its preference for consent and persuasion over more active measures is particularly notable.\(^2\)

This report examines the characteristics of Japan’s efforts in recent history to advance democratic institutions and norms. It illustrates the broader trends and main areas of focus of Japanese ODA in the field. General trends to date demonstrate that Japanese efforts clearly concentrate on areas such as administrative management and judicial support, but Japan is also engaged in a wide range of issues and projects that can be categorized as democracy support. Thus, the report attempts to identify various initiatives and actors involved while also highlighting some unique cases. It also analyzes sources of conflicting views—views for and against democracy support—while examining issues that have affected recent discussions on democracy support in Japanese politics, government, and civil society.

The report starts with a brief review of the history of Japan’s involvement in democracy support. It then seeks to analyze the general characteristics of Japan’s support, based on an analysis of ODA data from the past decade, before proceeding to discuss ideas and reasons that explain Japan’s approach. The report next looks at recent developments in discussions related to democracy support in Japanese politics, government, and civil society, while explaining roles that have been played by different actors. This is followed by a section that lists areas of democracy support in which Japan has been engaged in recent years. While the list is not comprehensive, it is designed to illustrate the breadth of Japanese involvement in the field. The paper then ends with a discussion of how Japan might be able to expand its efforts related to support for democratic governance, which is accompanied by a list of democracy-related areas where Japan is not currently active but could potentially explore.
2. A Brief History of Japan’s Support for Democracy-Related Issues

Japan emerged as one of the world’s major foreign aid donors in the late 1980s. By 1989, Japan became the largest donor in the world in terms of the amount of ODA provided, and under Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, Japan began discussing ODA as a part of its commitment to international peace. With heightened international interest in democracy support after the Cold War, and as the country faced the need to set clearer goals for its foreign aid, Japan adopted the ODA Charter in 1992, which explicitly refers to democracy as a consideration in foreign aid decision making. In 2003, the ODA Charter was revised and the new wording further emphasized human rights and democracy. Issues surrounding democracy support gained greater attention in Japan’s foreign policy in the mid-2000s, when Foreign Minister Aso, who was part of the first Abe cabinet, began discussing the creation of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” in Asia based on values such as human rights, the rule of law, freedom, and democracy.

The second Abe administration, which took office in 2012, adopted a National Security Strategy in 2013 that positioned freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as Japan’s national interest within the context of national security. The Development Cooperation Charter adopted in 2015 also lists support for democratization as a priority issue.

Generally speaking, Japan’s support for this field has been gradually increasing, but political developments have coincided with, or may have triggered, jumps in the amount of ODA allocated to that goal. Figure 1 shows ODA allocations to “government and civil society,” the category most relevant to democracy support in the OECD data on foreign aid since 2002. (Allocations under this category were zero prior to 2002.) The amount went up in 2003, for example, when the ODA Charter was revised. It increased again in 2006 and 2007, around the time of the first Abe administration and when the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was being introduced. There was also a slight increase in 2013, which coincided with the adoption of the National Security Strategy.

Figure 1. Japan’s support for government and civil society (US$ millions)

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System; modified from figure in Ichihara (2018), 41.
3. General Trends and Views For and Against Japan’s Support for Democracy-Related Issues

While the Japanese government’s aid for initiatives related to democracy increased over the years, Japan’s commitment in terms of the proportion of overall ODA directed toward that goal remains limited, especially in comparison to the United States and European liberal democracies.

Table 1 shows the percentage of ODA allocated for government and civil society support. Between 2007 and 2016—the most recent 10 years for which data is available—Japan’s support for government and civil society as a share of its total ODA was 2.1 percent, placing Japan at 26th out of 29 countries. This is substantially lower than countries like Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries, all of which allocated more than 10 percent to this category.

Looking at the substance of the aid allocated to government and civil society support (tables 2 and 3), the bulk of the funds went to the categories of “public sector policy and administrative management” and “judicial support.” In some years, the share of funds going to election support increased, but these were one-time contributions and not a change in the overall trend. In contrast, almost no funds were allocated to categories such as civil society development over the years.

Table 1. Percentage of aid for government and civil society in total ODA, 2007–2016

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Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System; modified from table in Ichihara (2018), 44.
### Table 2. Allocation of Japan’s support for government and civil society by subcategory, 2007–2016 (percentage)

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Legislatures and political parties</td>
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Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.

### Table 3. Allocation of Japan’s support for government and civil society by subcategory, 2007–2016 (US$ millions)

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Total Government and Civil Society | 266.9   | 217.9   | 97.6    | 157.3   | 525.2   | 297.8   | 412.1   | 302.7   | 317.3   | 336.1   | 2930.8  |

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.
Table 4 shows Japan’s support for the government and civil society sector by recipient. During this period, there was a large contribution to Afghanistan, which amounted to half of Japan’s total support for the sector. In 2012, Japan committed to providing up to US$3 billion for the reconstruction of the country over a five-year period, and the amount here reflects that commitment.

Aside from Afghanistan, the table shows that countries in Southeast Asia that are in the transitional or democratic consolidation phases—namely Cambodia, Indonesia, and Vietnam—were top recipients of Japan’s support. Considering the importance of the region to Japan, this is not surprising. The bulk of support to these countries went to public policy and administrative management assistance, followed by judicial development, which is consistent with the general trend of Japan’s democracy-related support.

Japan’s tendency to focus on less politically sensitive areas stems from its historical background. Because of Japan’s past aggression and colonization in Asia, it has been extremely cautious to avoid actions that could be viewed as interference in the domestic political affairs of other countries, especially in Asia, and Japan has come to adhere to the principle of non-interference in its aid policy. Japanese ODA has focused on economic development as a primary

| Table 4. Amount and share of Japan’s support for government and civil society by recipient, 2007–2016 |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Afghanistan                      | 41.3   | 40.3   | 0.6    | 37.2   | 256.4  | 159.4  | 297.9  | 205.9  | 191.3  | 194.3  | 1424.6  |
| Indonesia                        | 13.7   | 12.5   | 9.5    | 12.5   | 119.6  | 13.2   | 7.7    | 12.6   | 14.7   | 10.7   | 226.9   |
| Cambodia                         | 11.9   | 15.2   | 3.0    | 6.0    | 19.3   | 9.7    | 2.9    | 6.0    | 3.8    | 4.2    | 819.2   |
| Viet Nam                         | 22.7   | 4.6    | 4.1    | 3.4    | 2.6    | 5.3    | 3.8    | 4.6    | 4.1    | 6.0    | 613.2   |
| Lao PDR                          | 10.6   | 1.5    | 1.6    | 2.4    | 4.8    | 6.4    | 5.6    | 4.3    | 3.4    | 2.2    | 42.8    |
| Kenya                            | 25.5   | 1.8    | 1.1    | 0.8    | 0.7    | 3.7    | 0.5    | 0.3    | 0.1    | 1.7    | 36.2    |
| Jordan                           | 0.2    | 14.5   | 0.0    | 0.9    | 9.3    | 0.6    | 0.6    | 2.5    | 4.5    | 2.4    | 35.6    |
| Nepal                            | 9.9    | 0.9    | 1.1    | 1.1    | 1.7    | 1.8    | 3.6    | 1.1    | 3.9    | 7.9    | 33.1    |
| West Bank & Gaza Strip           | 11.1   | 0.3    | 11.8   | 2.3    | 2.4    | 0.6    | 0.6    | 0.3    | 0.9    | 0.2    | 30.5    |
| Ghana                            | 12.3   | 15.0   | 0.7    | 0.2    | 0.3    | 0.1    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.1    | 28.8    |
| Philippines                      | 0.3    | 6.2    | 0.5    | 4.9    | 4.5    | 2.6    | 2.3    | 2.8    | 3.2    | 0.4    | 27.9    |
| Tanzania                         | 6.1    | 1.4    | 1.0    | 2.1    | 2.2    | 4.5    | 2.3    | 1.7    | 2.3    | 3.4    | 27.0    |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 1.6    | 10.4   | 2.3    | 2.8    | 2.8    | 0.4    | 0.1    | 0.0    | 1.7    | 4.8    | 25.7    |
| Myanmar                          | 0.4    | 0.3    | 0.1    | 0.3    | 0.3    | 3.4    | 3.4    | 4.6    | 4.5    | 8.1    | 25.6    |
| Mongolia                         | 6.9    | 8.2    | 0.2    | 0.3    | 0.6    | 0.7    | 0.5    | 0.7    | 3.1    | 3.5    | 24.8    |
| Asia, regional                   | 0.9    | 0.5    | 0.9    | 0.7    | 0.9    | 1.8    | 2.2    | 1.1    | 1.6    | 11.7   | 22.4    |
| Sri Lanka                        | 10.6   | 0.1    | 0.3    | 2.0    | 3.0    | 2.8    | 2.8    | 1.2    | 1.0    | 0.3    | 22.3    |
| Pakistan                         | 3.6    | 7.3    | 0.3    | 3.8    | 3.2    | 1.5    | 1.9    | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.2    | 21.9    |
| Bangladesh                       | 1.7    | 1.0    | 1.3    | 0.1    | 0.4    | 2.3    | 1.2    | 3.7    | 4.2    | 3.8    | 19.8    |
| Sierra Leone                     | 2.8    | 0.1    | 0.0    | 1.5    | 2.7    | 6.6    | 2.5    | 0.9    | 0.1    | 1.6    | 19.1    |
| Uganda                           | 0.1    | 0.6    | 1.3    | 0.8    | 0.5    | 14.9   | 0.2    | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.2    | 18.8    |
| South Sudan                      | 18.9   |        |        | 3.4    | 3.8    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 11.7    |
| Senegal                          | 4.4    | 7.7    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 17.5    |
| Sudan                            | 3.3    | 1.2    | 11.1   | 1.0    | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.2    | 0.3    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 17.4    |
| Madagascar                       | 6.2    | 8.7    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 0.0    | 1.0    | 0.0    | 16.2    |
| Africa, regional                 | 0.1    | 0.6    | 0.1    | 0.2    | 0.7    | 1.4    | 4.8    | 1.2    | 4.7    | 2.3    | 16.1    |
| China (People’s Republic of)     | 2.1    | 3.2    | 2.6    | 2.0    | 1.3    | 1.2    | 1.1    | 0.7    | 0.8    | 0.9    | 16.0    |
| Timor-Leste                      | 0.9    | 0.2    | 0.5    | 0.4    | 0.3    | 0.4    | 0.3    | 4.3    | 1.2    | 1.0    | 6.8    |
| Developing countries, unspecified| 4.1    | 4.3    | 7.2    | 39.7   | 41.5   | 7.6    | 20.8   | 6.0    | 7.9    | 7.8    | 147.0   |
| Other developing countries       | 55.6   | 53.6   | 41.4   | 68.6   | 84.2   | 43.9   | 57.8   | 40.0   | 55.3   | 55.4   | 556.0   |
| Total                            | 266.9  | 217.9  | 97.6   | 157.3  | 525.2  | 297.8  | 412.1  | 302.7  | 317.3  | 336.1  | 2930.8  |

Source: OECD, Creditor Reporting System.
target from the beginning, and the culture, practice, and expertise of Japan's foreign assistance developed around that objective. Thus, in any areas that may be related to democracy support, Japan's activities tend to focus on technical assistance, the provision of equipment, and administrative management, which are less political and hence less controversial in the view of Japanese aid agencies. Furthermore, Japan's approach to ODA has been to operate on the basis of requests from the recipient country's government. This is intended to ensure the recipient government's initiative and ownership over assistance projects, and the Japanese government considers this an important strength of Japan's ODA, differentiating it from its Western counterparts who sometimes adopt more forceful, interventionist approaches, particularly in areas such as democracy support.

However, the government-to-government approach necessarily favors the recipient government's current position rather than encouraging diversity and competitiveness in the political landscape of the country, and it limits Japan's support to only countries where recipient governments are willing to accept such aid. As a result, it limits the effectiveness of the aid, particularly on issues related to democratic governance.

On the other hand, favorable views of democracy support derive from both normative and security concerns in Japan. As an advanced, stable, liberal democracy in Asia, Japan views democracy as a guiding principle and the foundation of its domestic political system, and many Japanese consider it an important endeavor to advance democracy as a universal value in the world. In this sense, the country also recognizes expectations from other democratic nations that it play a role in championing democracy internationally, and from time to time the Japanese government has felt pressure—from both domestic and international sources—to do so more expressly and vocally. Such pressures have helped to shape ODA policy and Japanese political rhetoric to champion democracy and the rule of law over the years, although it may be argued that its scope is still limited.

In addition, security concerns have played a major role in motivating Japan to promote democracy in the region. Undeniably, China has been a big factor in this, and the concept of an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity represents an example where democracy support was linked to security concerns. In light of China's rise to become a major power and its increasing influence in the region, Japan hopes to strengthen its ties with allies. Emphasizing its presence as a liberal democracy and differentiating itself from China are part of that effort. As Japan searches for strategies to counterbalance China, issues of democracy support can gain greater salience in Japan's foreign policy.
4. Recent Developments

4.1 Politics

There is a heightened interest and concern among Japanese politicians about the course of the country's foreign policy. As noted above, China’s rise and its growing influence in Asia and the world is a major source of concern. The return of autocratic governments in some Asian countries that were thought to be on their way to democracy also presents a worrisome prospect from Japan's view. These issues have multiple aspects, affecting not just security, geopolitics, economics, and trade, but also in a broader sense, the future of democracy and of the liberal international order from which Japan has greatly benefited in the postwar era. Japanese politicians have been discussing and contemplating strategies and policies toward other nations—and particularly toward such Southeast Asian countries as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka—in recent months and years.

For example, the July 2018 Cambodian elections became a contentious and problematic topic in Japan, as the Japanese government went ahead and supported the election although it was largely seen as unfair and undemocratic, controlled by the government of President Hun Sen. Some Diet members, including Yukihisa Fujita and Kentaro Gemma, vocally questioned the Japanese government’s decision to provide election support to Cambodia. Civil society groups also reacted, calling on the government to reverse its decision. Experts in this movement included academics, NGO leaders, as well as a number of former Japanese UN officials, such as Yasushi Akashi.

The government defended its position, saying it was worthwhile to provide support so that the election could be as fair as possible. The fundamental debate, however, is how Japan should deal with governments in other Asian countries that are autocratic or in transition when it is feared that severing ties with those countries might mean losing out to China. It is obvious from various politicians’ comments that there is no consensus on what is the best approach, and no one seems to have articulated a clear path forward that appeals broadly to mainstream policy thinkers in Japan.

Generally speaking, few Japanese politicians have been exceptionally vocal about democracy support, and those who are interested in related topics seem to focus on specific cases such as women’s empowerment and refugee rights. However, more general discussions on issues particularly related to democracy support took place in a research committee on international economic and foreign policy (Kokusai Keizai/Gaiko ni Kansuru Chosakai) in the House of Councillors in May 2017, where the role of the parliament in foreign policy was one of the main topics. Experts on democracy support, including a representative from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Japan Office, were invited to testify, and some committee members, including Sayaka Sasaki, have demonstrated a particular interest in the importance of working with NGOs and foundations in relation to supporting democracy abroad, pointing to the role of the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States as one example.

In addition, a number of parliamentarians who are interested in the role of NGOs in foreign assistance have also shown interest in issues of democracy support, including Keisuke Suzuki, an up-and-coming politician from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Some senior LDP politicians, such as Taro Kono and Fumio Kishida, have also shown interest in issues related to democratic governance support, and they may play a key role if the topic is to be advanced in Japan’s foreign policy.

On the broader issue of political rhetoric, while “democracy” as a concept is commonly accepted as a vital part of Japanese politics and foreign policy, in foreign policy speeches, politicians often use terms such as “universal values” or “shared values” when discussing democracy. Using such phrases sometimes implies keeping nondemocratic countries in check, especially
China. Reference to the rule of law is more popular to suggest something similar to liberalism. One notable trend in Japan is that there is a great awareness and acceptance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in the political, business, and social sectors, as well as among the general public. Thus, the language in the SDGs, including Goal 16, which is closely related to democratic governance, could be widely accepted in Japan at many levels.

4.2 Government

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is responsible for handling Japan’s foreign policy and foreign assistance, and it plays a major role in decision making concerning Japan’s efforts related to democracy support abroad. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), positioned under MOFA, is the implementing body of Japanese ODA. With approximately 2,000 staff, JICA is responsible for administering development projects, bilateral loans, and grants as part of Japan’s foreign assistance. JICA’s staff are considered experts in foreign aid, and in some cases have greater expertise than staff at MOFA, whose positions tend to rotate every few years. Thus, while MOFA oversees JICA, the ministry often depends on the implementing agency for expertise in developing aid policies and strategies for each recipient country.

JICA has substantial experience in the field of economic cooperation in particular, and it has internalized Japan’s foreign aid culture and practices, such as the principle of noninterference and the government-to-government approach. Thus, it has not been a major driving force to advance new fields such as democracy support in Japan’s foreign policy, and there is strong hesitation within the agency to engage in issues that could be seen as political or controversial.

However, in reality, many of JICA’s projects are related to support for democratic governance, especially those that are carried out under the banner of “good governance.” These include judicial and election support, women’s empowerment, and peacebuilding efforts, although the support tends to be limited to technical assistance and the provision of equipment and is often biased toward the recipient government’s position.

In addition to MOFA and JICA, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has also been involved in this field through their judicial support projects that send experts and host programs for judicial personnel training, often in cooperation with non-profit entities such as the International Civil and Commercial Law Centre Foundation (ICCLC) and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA). The National Police Agency also has been engaged in projects related to support for law enforcement, such as police officer training, some of which can be related to support for democratic governance.

The Japanese government also works with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and other UN agencies in implementing democracy-related projects. Japan was also a major contributor for the UN Democracy Fund. However, here again, Japan prefers a less interventionist approach and remains a less visible player on this front. At the regional level, the UN Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders has a close working relationship with the MOJ.

In recent years, at JICA and in Japan’s foreign aid community in general, there has been greater awareness and a certain level of urgency to reconsider Japan’s foreign aid strategy and usage of ODA. China’s foreign aid resembles that of Japan, as both emphasize noninterference and noninterventionist principles. Thus, Japan needs to find a way to differentiate itself to be able to maintain its relevance in the international aid community given that it is no longer able to compete with China in terms of the scale of its foreign aid budget. JICA’s current leadership is said to be relatively sympathetic to views that Japan should prioritize issues such as the advancement of universal values, and while democracy support is a challenging subject that has no clear formula on
how it should be done, space for discussion may be opening up.

4.3 Civil Society

Japan’s nonprofit sector still remains relatively underdeveloped and resource-poor compared to those of North America and Europe, and its activities tend to be limited in general. In addition, there are very few nongovernmental organizations in Japan that vocally identify their missions as promoting democracy in other countries. Many organizations are hesitant to do so because they are afraid to be labeled as political activists, which could curb their opportunities for fundraising and networking in Japan. It could also limit their access to countries where they wish to work if they are seen as unwanted political groups by host governments. A few exceptions include Genron NPO, which is known for conducting studies and holding seminars to promote democracy in Asia, and Inter Band, an NGO that undertakes election support and other projects related to democracy promotion.

In reality, however, a number of Japanese charitable foundations, nongovernmental organizations, and universities engage in activities that are related to the advancement of democracy in Asia and elsewhere. For example, many humanitarian organizations are involved in projects that have elements of promoting democracy, such as community building, education, and the empowerment of women and other minority groups. In the field of judicial support in particular, as mentioned earlier, nongovernmental entities such as the ICCLC, the JFBA, and Nagoya University have also been active and have implemented a number of programs, some with the cooperation of JICA and some that are done independently.

In fact, the beginning of Japan’s judicial support in Asia illustrates the important role played by the nongovernmental sector. A Nagoya University professor, Akio Morishima, is considered a pioneer in the field as he helped to launch Japan’s judicial support projects in the mid-1990s. The Ministry of Justice in Vietnam initially requested that the Japanese government support the drafting of Vietnam’s civil code, but when that went nowhere, they asked Professor Morishima for help. The professor subsequently worked with MOFA and the MOJ, both of which were unsure how to respond. In the end, Professor Morishima was sent to Vietnam with funding from the Japan Foundation, a quasigovernmental foundation at that time. He followed up later by flying to Vietnam with funding from the university as well as his own personal funds, and in 1994, when the Japanese government’s mission officially received a request from the Vietnamese government to support the country in drafting its civil code as an ODA project, MOFA and the MOJ looked to Professor Morishima to coordinate and launch the project in Vietnam. Judicial support has become one of the main features of Japan’s foreign assistance, but would not have been possible without the efforts and support of nongovernmental leaders such as Professor Morishima.

Over the last two decades, networks among the MOJ, courts, the bar association, scholars, and lawyers have been established, contributing to the collective expertise in this area. Meanwhile, Nagoya University continues to be active in the field and has founded Japanese law education centers in countries such as Vietnam and Mongolia.

Experts on democracy assistance suggest that Japan needs to strengthen the involvement of its NGO sector, while the sector itself also needs to step up its efforts in the field. This would involve building a better environment for NGO activities in the field, including raising awareness among the public of the importance of Japan’s engagement in supporting democracies abroad and strengthening the funding base. Many also believe that NGOs can play an important role in establishing multiple channels of cooperation with aid recipient countries and their societies, which will make Japan’s efforts to support democratic governance more substantive and effective.
5. Democracy-Related Areas Where Japan Is Currently Active

The following is a select list of areas in which Japan has been active in recent years that are relevant for the advancement of democratic institutions and norms. While the list is not comprehensive, it gives some concrete examples of the types of projects being conducted, and it also includes some projects that are less frequently noted when discussing Japan’s support for the field in order to give a sense of the broader range of activities that may be overlooked in ODA data. The aim here is to expand the discussion on Japan’s democracy support beyond the general trends and to look at the wider range of relevant issues that Japan’s work entails, although in some cases the number of projects or amount of aid may still be limited at this point.

a. Judicial Support

Among Japan’s various initiatives related to support for democratic institutions and norms, one of its main focuses has been support for the rule of law and judicial systems in developing countries, and it has developed substantial expertise in the field since the 1990s. Some of the main activities undertaken in the area of judicial support include the following: 28

1. Supporting the drafting of civil, criminal, and commercial codes
2. Organizing seminars and training for judicial personnel
3. Dispatching Japanese experts (long and short term)
4. Hosting study visits to Japan

Examples:

Vietnam’s judicial system reform: Since 2015, JICA has been carrying out the Technical Assistance Project for Legal and Judicial System Reform for 2020. In cooperation with the ICCLC, the project provides advice and guidance for capacity building of the country’s Ministry of Justice, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Vietnam Federation of Bar Associations by examining, preparing, and applying legal normative documents. 29

Cambodia’s civil codes: Japan was actively involved in the drafting of Cambodia’s Code of Civil Procedure and Civil Code, which were adopted in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Following the completion of a five-year project to train core personnel at the Ministry of Justice, the Royal Academy for Judicial Professions, the Bar Association, and Royal University of Law and Economics on these codes in March 2017, another five-year project was launched to improve the application of the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure. The ICCLC was the secretariat and managed these projects. 30

Rule of Law Centres in Myanmar: In 2016, the Japanese government provided US$1 million in funding support to the Rule of Law Centres in Myanmar, established by UNDP in Yangon and Mandalay, as well as in Myitkyina (Kachin State) and Taunggyi (Shan State). The centers are designed to help legal professionals, community leaders, and civil society organizations access knowledge, nurture skills, and raise awareness of the law. 31

Helping establish bar associations: In 2009, the JFBA provided funding and support to help Vietnam establish its first bar association. The JFBA had been working in partnership with JICA for a number of years to dispatch legal experts to Vietnam and support the country’s efforts to develop its expertise. 32

b. Support for Administrative Functions

Japan has implemented and supported programs designed to strengthen the administrative functions of recipient countries’ governments both at the national and local levels. They include providing financial support, training personnel, hosting trainees, and conducting exchange programs. In addition to JICA, other Japanese
governmental entities involved in this effort have included the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC).

**Examples:**

**Strengthening government technical expertise:** In 2006, the Japanese government pledged ¥10 billion to establish the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), an ASEAN-based think tank that conducts research related to regional integration and undertakes initiatives that aim to expand policy research capacity in the region's least-developed countries. These often have a special focus on expanding the technical expertise of government officials in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Myanmar.33

**Improving capacity to handle claims against an administration:** The Government Inspectorate of Vietnam needed to improve its capacity to handle an increasing number of claims brought by citizens against the government. In 2013, the MIC signed an agreement with the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam to cooperate in this area, and it has implemented a three-year training program funded by JICA.34

**c. Election Support**

Japan has supported elections in countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Efforts in this area have included

1. Providing financial support, materials, and equipment
2. Training election officers
3. Dispatching observers
4. Providing security

**Examples:**

**Automation of the voter identification process in Kyrgyzstan:** JICA provided a grant to UNDP of up to ¥740 million to support fair and transparent elections from 2015 to 2017. The project provided equipment to verify voter identity and conducted a training-the-trainers program on the correct usage of the system for approximately 300 people around the country.35

**d. Support for Legislatures**

Japan has supported the legislative functions of developing countries by hosting various seminars and dispatching experts to assist with the drafting of civil and commercial codes. In addition, a number of nongovernmental organizations have political exchange programs for parliamentary members.

**Examples:**

**ODA to strengthen legislative capacity in the Pacific Islands:** In March 2018, the Japanese government pledged US$5.2 million through UNDP for an initiative to expand the capacity of the legislatures in Samoa, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia, and to scale up ongoing support for the parliaments of the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Fiji. This is designed to strengthen the work of their committees related to legislation and oversight (especially with regard to key development issues), build the capacities of legislators and the professionalism of staff, and improve the budget process and financial oversight capacity of the legislatures. It builds on previous Japanese support for the region, such as the Fiji Parliament Support Program.36

**Support for the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA):** In 2016, the Japanese government pledged new support for AIPA through ERIA. This funding is intended to support research and capacity-building initiatives for AIPA, whose activities also include parliamentary exchanges with Japanese legislators.37

**e. Support for Law Enforcement**

Japan considers assistance for police systems to be part of its democracy-related initiatives, and it has provided support—directly or indirectly through international organizations—to strengthen the law enforcement agencies of aid recipient countries.
Examples:
**Strengthening the Afghan National Police through judo:** JICA has been providing financial assistance and expertise for a program to help train Afghan police officers through judo. Since 2011, thousands of Afghan cadets have undergone training in Turkey, aided by six JICA judo experts who were previously members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. The training includes not only practical judo but also lectures on professional ethics and discipline. JICA also has supported UN projects to increase the number of police officers and to provide education and training for police forces. The National Policy Agency also hosted Afghan police officers visiting Japan.38

**f. Media Support**
Japan has provided equipment, technical assistance, and expert training in order to support media infrastructure. Japan has also assisted in drafting media-related laws. Private entities, such as NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), have cooperated in some cases.

Examples:
**Media support in South Sudan:** In January 2013, JICA launched the Project for Institutional Capacity Development of South Sudan TV and Radio (SSTVR) to reform the state-run broadcaster into a public system that is independent of the government. The project provided equipment and capacity-development training for journalists, program producers, and equipment engineers.39

**Building the media sector for democratization in Nepal:** Between 2010 and 2013, JICA supported Nepal’s Ministry of Information and Communications in drafting a revised media policy, legislation, regulations, and guidelines. It also supported Radio Nepal’s reform to become a public service broadcaster through capacity-development programs for its staff.40

Launching a satellite broadcast system in Afghanistan: Between 2002 and 2004, JICA provided the necessary equipment and facilities in order to launch a national broadcast system using satellites. An NHK affiliate that provided technical expertise as a contractor for the project estimated that the broadcasts reached 4 million people.41

**g. Peacebuilding**
The Japanese government and nongovernmental institutions have a strong record of supporting conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives around the world. In particular, the Japanese government has increased its efforts in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, and Afghanistan has been one of the major recipients of this support.

Examples:
**Japanese Initiative for the future of Syrian Refugees (JISR) by JICA and UNHCR:** Launched in 2016, JISR provides academic opportunities for young Syrian refugees to study at graduate programs in Japanese universities for two to three years. This is the first JICA project where refugees are accepted in Japan as students. The program is carried out in cooperation with UNHCR and is designed to contribute to Syria’s future reconstruction.42

**Nippon Foundation Myanmar Support Program:** Japan’s largest private foundation, the Nippon Foundation, has a long history of working in Myanmar. Since 2016, it has channeled millions of dollars to initiatives in areas that have been home to minority populations previously at conflict with the central government in order to build confidence in the peace process. The projects have ranged from humanitarian assistance to infrastructure development, and each activity is pursued on the basis of consensus formed between the central government and the ethnic armed organizations in the area.43
Training peacebuilders: The Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, a nonprofit organization, offers a number of short courses in Hiroshima and Tokyo to train approximately 40 beginner and mid-career peacebuilding practitioners annually from developing countries as well as from Japan on practical skills to use on the ground. This is carried out on a contract basis with funding from MOFA.

Supporting local ethnic reconciliation: The Japan International Volunteer Center, another nonprofit organization, has worked in Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas of Iraq since 2009 to foster reconciliation among ethnic groups. It partners with local NGOs to teach conflict resolution techniques to local and refugee children through theater and the arts, as well as to foster tolerance among them. As part of these programs, social workers and other experts also provide services for children who are suffering psychologically from the conflict.

h. Education

Educational programs—especially those targeting minority and other socially and economically disadvantaged populations—contribute to building the environment necessary for nurturing democracy.

Examples:

Education for ethnic harmony in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From 2008 to 2014, JICA implemented an IT education project targeting high schools to integrate ethnic differences in education and build educators’ networks that include different ethnic groups.

Education for female students in Pakistan: Japan supported a project in 2013 to promote intermediate education for female students in Hyderabad and adjacent provinces in southern Pakistan. Coordinating with the United States, Japan's aid supplemented a US-led effort to discourage the radicalization of Islamic politics.

i. Women’s Empowerment

Various projects have been implemented with Japan's support that are designed to empower women and promote gender equality in countries that are in transition to democracy. They include education for women, various seminars, and training programs to strengthen women's roles in the public sector.

Examples:

Training of female police officers: JICA, in cooperation with UNDP, has been supporting the training of female police officers in Afghanistan since 2014 in order to strengthen their role in the country's police force as well as in combatting violence against women and girls.

Training for female government officials: As part of the “Development Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment,” which was announced in May 2016, the government of Japan undertook a three-year effort to train about 5,000 female government administrative officials and to improve the learning environment for about 50,000 girls by the end of 2018.

Supporting women entrepreneurs: In July 2017, on the occasion of the G20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany, Japan pledged US$50 million to support the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative. This initiative, which is housed at the World Bank, supports women-led businesses and works with governments to improve the laws and regulations stifling women entrepreneurs in developing countries.

j. Anticorruption Training

Japan has contributed to the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund. Japan also collaborates closely with the Tokyo-based UN Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which handles various anticorruption programs, including seminars and training.
Examples:
Training law enforcement agencies in Northern Africa: In 2015, the Japanese government and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) launched an anticorruption training program for law enforcement agencies in the Sahel region. This involves workshops and other training for 16 mid- and senior-level officials from government agencies and other institutions in the region. The UNITAR Hiroshima Office, in particular, had significant experience designing and delivering anticorruption and transparency training in postconflict countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and thus was well equipped to work with the Japanese government on this initiative. 

6. Next Steps for Expanding Support for Democracy-Related Issues

There are a number of ways in which Japan can expand its support for issues related to democracy. First, in connection with ODA, most experts on Japanese foreign aid consider that overhauling the entire system is neither realistic nor necessary at this point to prioritize support for democratic governance. Similarly, suddenly taking an outright hostile position toward undemocratic regimes in recipient countries where Japan has established some good relationships as a donor may not always be a wise option. Rather, introducing elements of democracy support in existing projects is a more feasible course of action and a good way to strengthen Japan’s commitment to and the effectiveness of its foreign aid in the field. For example, one democratic governance expert suggested that incorporating civic education at the local, grassroots level in current JICA programs (e.g., youth education, agricultural assistance, etc.) would be a good step forward and

Other Areas Related to Democracy

The following are examples of areas where Japan appears to be less active currently but where experts suggest it should consider expanding its efforts:

a. Additional work related to the rule of law
   • Expanding access to justice
   • Commercial codes to encourage entrepreneurship

b. Additional support for administration and legislature
   • Improving transparency
   • Strengthening checks and balances

c. Support for political participation and political parties
   • Civic education at the local level

d. Expanding media support
   • Assisting aspiring journalists
   • Expanding support to cover independent, nongovernmental media

e. Support for scholars and dissidents in nondemocratic states
   • Collaboration with organizations such as Scholars at Risk

f. Development of the nonprofit sector
   • Providing direct support for local civil society organizations
   • Assisting in the drafting of NPO laws
   • Supporting think tanks/policy institutes in Asia
could have an important effect in developing
democratic governance in a recipient country in
the long run. Looking at the higher education
level, those involved in judicial support suggest
that working with universities and students has
contributed to nurturing the next generation of
legal personnel and they recommend that such
projects be expanded further. Media experts
also point out the important role of the free
media and the presence of aspiring journalists
in currently nondemocratic countries, and they
suggest assisting those journalists and inde-
pendent media as a potential project that could
greatly contribute to democratic governance.

Second, part of the reason that Japan has
not been very active in some areas linked to
democracy support may be that Japanese ODA is
typically provided only at the request of
recipient governments. Thus, some scholars
and experts suggest that revising or modify-
ing the government-to-government approach
could open up a path to use ODA more effectively.
There is also the need to diversify channels, and
experts have suggested that further strengthen-
ing the involvement of civil society is necessary
and would prove beneficial. Also, experts sug-
gest that another potential way to make Japan's
foreign assistance more effective would be to
change the priorities of Japan's ODA—which
is currently disproportionately focused on the
provision of money, infrastructure, and goods—
to focus more on people and ideas.

Third, in order to support changes in ODA
policy and strengthen the involvement of civil
society, there is a need to build a sympathetic
audience in Japan among politicians, govern-
ment officials, and the public. In particular,
with lingering sensitivities around Japan's history
of aggression in Asia and its tendency to avoid
any political engagement for fear of being seen as
controversial, there is a need to cautiously select
the terminology to be used to describe support
for democratic governance in order to ensure it
can gain traction and support in Japan's foreign
aid debate. At the same time, education and
awareness-raising for Japan's domestic audience
at all levels will be one important aspect of this
effort. There is also a need for more discussion
and debate so that the Japanese people can
better understand what support for democratic
governance means to the country and to artic-
ulate how such ideas can be translated into
concrete projects.

2. For example, see Sato, “Japan,” and Sugiura, *Minshuka shien*. Terms “democracy support” and “democracy assistance” are used interchangeably in this paper while there may be some differences.

3. Analysis of ODA data in this and the following sections generally follow the framework presented by Ichihara. See Ichihara, *Japan’s International Democracy Assistance*, especially pages 40–58. The category of “Government and Civil Society” in the OECD data on foreign aid includes the following 11 sectors: (1) public sector policy and administrative management; (2) public finance management; (3) decentralization and support to subnational government; (4) anti-corruption organizations and institutions; (5) legal and judicial development; (6) democratic participation and civil society; (7) elections; (8) legislatures and political parties; (9) media and free flow of information; (9) human rights; (10) women’s equality organizations and institutions; and (11) ending violence against women and girls.


5. See, for example, Sugiura, “Nihon no minshuka gaiko.”


7. The jump in 2011 was largely due to contributions to Afghanistan, which received US$256 million of government and civil society support that year, while Indonesia also received a large portion (approximately US$120 million in ODA loans) that year.

8. This figure includes all aid. JICA reported that the agency had spent only 3.3 percent of its budget for South Asia on projects in Afghanistan in 2014. See JICA, *JICA Annual Report 2015*, 39; Richard Kraemer, “U.S.-Japan Democracy Assistance in Afghanistan,” in *U.S.-Japan Approaches to Democracy Promotion*, 81–92. But there were contributions of larger amounts from MOFA to projects conducted by UNDP and other international organizations. While Japan generally avoided becoming engaged in politically charged tasks, its involvement in the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) process and intervention in the reform of the Afghan Ministry of Defense have been described as “noteworthy.” Ibid., 85. See also Caroline A. Hartzell, “Missed Opportunities: The Impact of DDR on SSR in Afghanistan,” *United States Institute of Peace Special Report* 270 (2011): 1–14.


10. Based on interviews with JICA officials. Also, see *Japan’s International Democracy Assistance and Japanese democracy assistance* (chapter 3) by Ichihara for detailed analysis of Japan’s ODA.

11. Ownership is a key term repeatedly used by JICA to describe Japan’s ODA. For example, see JICA, *JICA 2017: Annual Report*. 
12. Issues relating to Japan's government-to-government approach were raised in the thought leaders seminar hosted by JCIE in June 2018.


14. For example, see Ichihara, *Japan's Strategic Approach*; and Yoichiro Sato, “Japan.”

15. Analysis in this section is largely based on discussions from the Diet roundtable and thought leaders seminar hosted by JCIE in June 2018, as well as research on records of parliamentary meetings available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.

16. Mr. Akashi headed a group of experts who collectively submitted a proposal to reverse the course of Japan's election assistance to Cambodia in July 2018. See the Global Peacebuilding Association website, http://www.gpaj.org/ja/2018/08/06/16833.

17. Other committee members who have expressed interest in the issue of support for democracy and the role of private foundations such as Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the NED include Yukihisa Fujita, Eiji Kidoguchi, and Hideya Sugio. Based on records available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/.


21. Interviews with JICA officials.

22. Ichihara, *Japanese Democracy Assistance*; Sugiura, “Nihon no minshuka gaiko.” Also, the author's interviews with JICA officials and a human rights NGO leader.

23. Interview with a human rights NGO leader.

24. Takeo Kosugi, “Ajia no hoseibi shien no genjo to kadai” [Current state and challenges of judicial support in Japan], *Gurobaru Keiei* (September 2016), 20–23.


28. In 2015, the Japanese government commissioned Mitsubishi Research Institute to evaluate the country’s judicial support. Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc., *Heisei 26 nendo gain musho ODA hyoka: Houseido seibi shien no hyoka, daishansha hyoka kokokusho* [FY2014 Ministry of Foreign Affairs ODA assessment: evaluation of judicial system support, third-party evaluation report], February 2015.


30. Ibid.


44. Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, "About the Program," https://eng.peacebuilderscenter.jp/program/.


52. Concluding analysis presented in this section was largely drawn from discussions in JCIE’s Diet roundtable and thought leaders seminar in June 2018, which were then supplemented by individual interviews with some of the participants of those events.